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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
""1.11 ,( IT OF UTAH
I "lain!iff Appellee,
Case Nn '. KOPft C \
vs.
PATRICK L. STANLEY,

Prior ity No 2

I i Ill, iidant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
' I Ihi is Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
I Jtah Code .Annotated Section 78 2a 3(2)(e)
Il,1" iSUES PRESENTED AN D STANDARDS Oi: ixi. \ it **
Whether the trial c ourt' s instn ictions to the ji lrj,r relatinp
defense were legally sufficient? A "trial court's statutory const

and its application

of the entrapment statute presents this Court with questions of law that are reviewed for
"coi i ectness' ""' State v , Richards,
j^

s

|ssue was

ra|se(j

^

a

.. ,..

instruction and in oral

trial (R. 246; R. 212 at 176-90).
°

Whether the ti ial court committed plain error, or caused Stanley to suffer a

iiiNiKiiiiilit'SJii iiiiustiu1, III mil1. liistniicliniiiL1, il 1114 I mimi11, i cgarding Csubstantive element of the charge 'that Stanley had a prior conviction1' 11 i ihLiin
1

appellate relief, Stanley must show: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn. 850 P. 2d
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996).
3.

Whether Stanley was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel? "Where

the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can only
determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as
a matter of law.. .If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but prejudice cannot be
determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d
351, 354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993).
To establish ineffective counsel Stanley must show: "(1) that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the
trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt.
781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah
App. 1989); State v. Gearv. 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
4.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict and finding that these

violations occurred in a "drug-free zone"? A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Goddard. 871

2

P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). However, this penalty enhancement adds
an extra element to the drug offense that "must be proved beyond a reasc ^ibic dmiiState \ J uwasn^
i ma issue was preserved in an oral motion to dismiss die enhancement made by
appellant at the close of the State's case (R. 212 at 54-55).

IIII

in irvanl statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A

mature of the Case

Honorable Lynn ^

Davis, after a jury trial at which Stanley was convicted of

a

' i ranging to Distribute Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone, a first degree felony,

and Possession of"I\ lethamphetamine in J I )''iii|i"" I "in, Zone with a hioi Conviction, a
degi ee felon)
—

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On ni or about April 14 1997, Patrick I, Stanley was charged by Amended

Informal I 11 II IIII 1 nmili I iislmul ( nun " iiillli

3

"I 'omit I .Arranging to Distribute

Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv).1 Count II-Illegal Drug Tax, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 59-19-103(l)(b).2 Count IllPossession or Use of Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone with a Prior Conviction,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R.
24).
On June 30, 1997, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge Lynn W.
Davis and Stanley was bound-over on all charges and "not guilty" pleas were entered
(R. 26-27, 208). On July 9, 1997, Stanley filed a Motion to Dismiss based on
Entrapment (R. 28-33). On July 15, 1997, an evidentiary hearing on Stanley's motion
was conducted after which the trial court denied the motion (R. 37-38, 209).
On September 30, 1997, Stanley filed a Motion and Limine to exclude evidence
of prior convictions from trial under Rules 403, 404(b) and 609 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 101-107).
On October 2-3, 1997, a jury trial was conducted and Stanley was convicted of
both charges (R. 156-64, 211-213).
On November 17, 1997, Stanley was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years
to life in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay fines in the amount of $1850.00 (R.

'The criminal information and jury instruction #3 cite Count I as a violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv). However, the language set forth therein actually
refers to Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1997).
2

This charge was subsequently dismissed by motion of the State on October 1, 1997.
4

185-86, 214). On December 17, 1997, Stanley filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Fourth District Court (R. 194). On February 19, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court
poured-over the appeal to this Court (R. 204).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Detective J.D. Mangum
J.D. Mangum, a detective with the Emery County Sheriffs office who is

assigned to the Carbon-Emery, testified that in March of 1997, he was working for the
Drug Task Force (R. 211 at 134, 135). Mangum testified that the work he did for the
Task Force mostly consisted of undercover activities and that he would have had longer
hair, a scruffy face, and worn street clothes in order to look like a drug dealer/buyer
rather than a cop (R. 211 at 139). Mangum testified that the use of confidential
informants is critical to the work of the Drug Task Force (R. 211 at 137-38). Mangum
also testified that most informants are either current or past drug users (R. 211 at 176).
Mangum testified that on March 27, 1997, he was contacted by a supervisor to
meet with Edie Randall, a confidential informant, at the Emery County Jail where
Randall was being held in-custody (R. 211 at 140). Mangum had been told that
Randall had participated as an informant in approximately 170 controlled buys and that
she was in custody on drug charges (R. 211 at 178, 181).
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Mangum met with Randall early in the evening (R. 211 at 141). Randall advised
Mangum that she wanted to get out of jail and that "she was willing to set up a drug
deal to do that" with a Patrick Stanley (Id.). At this point, Mangum did not know
Stanley (Id.).
Mangum advised Randall that he would work with her and that he would arrange
to have her released from jail on her own recognizance (R. 211 at 141-42). Mangum
then contacted the AP&P officers who had arrested Randall and they stipulated to her
release so Mangum contacted the Sheriff and he authorized Randall's release from
custody (R. 211 at 142).
Randall then paged Stanley and he returned the call (R. 211 at 142-43).
Mangum testified that Stanley was the only individual that Randall named or called for
a potential drug deal (R. 211 at 182). Mangum testified that Randall spoke with
Stanley for approximately five minutes and that an agreement had been made for the
purchase of an ounce of methamphetamine from Stanley for $1200 to be exchanged at
the K-Mart in Spanish Fork (R. 211 at 144-45). Mangum was to act as a drug dealer
during the exchange (R. 211 at 146, 147). Randall was to inform Stanley that she had
been in a traffic accident and that Mangum was a friend with whom she was staying
who wanted to purchase some methamphetamine (R. 211 at 146-47). Mangum testified
that a recording of Randall's call with Stanley was made and that he locked it in the
evidence locker but that the tape could not currently be found (R. 211 at 189).

6

Mangum testified that he then traveled to Springville to pick-up the $1200 while
other officers transported Randall to Springville (R. 211 at 145). Mangum and Randall
then proceeded to the K-Mart in Spanish Fork to meet with Stanley at approximately 9
p.m. (R. 211 at 147-48, 149). Stanley arrived at the K-Mart after Mangum and
Randall and he was alone (R. 211 at 149).
Randall initially spoke with Stanley alone for a few minutes in Stanley's vehicle
(R. 211 at 150).

Randall then returned to Mangum's vehicle and informed him that

Stanley wanted to get some dinner and that he did not have the methamphetamine (R.
211 at 151). Stanley then went to Taco Bell (Id.).
After Stanley returned, he, Mangum and Randall stood outside and discussed the
deal (Id.). Randall introduced Stanley to Mangum (R. 211 at 152). Stanley then told
Mangum that "he didn't bring the stuff with him" and that he wanted Mangum "to
front him the whole amount of money so he could take it to Salt Lake" (R. 211 at 15152). According to Mangum, Stanley was told that he wanted to purchase two ounces of
methamphetamine (R. 211 at 152). Stanley asked Mangum if he "was going to stand
good for her debt" (R. 211 at 153). This surprised Mangum because he did not know
"there was any debt to be had" (Id.). Mangum refused to pay the debt and testified
that Stanley then suggested that he keep a portion of the methamphetamine in payment
for the debt (R. 211 at 154).
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Mangum then gave Stanley $100 and they agreed to meet later at a motel in Lehi
after Stanley got the methamphetamine from Salt Lake City (R. 211 at 154-55).
Mangum testified that Stanley showed no reluctance in relation to the transaction (R.
211 at 157).
Mangum testified that he was wearing a recording device at the K-Mart and that
he believed that a recording was made of the meeting (R. 211 at 189). However,
Mangum testified that he did not know where the tape currently was located and that he
has "never had contact with that tape" (Id.).
Mangum, Randall and the other officers who had been surveilling the meeting
then proceeded to a motel in Lehi (R. 211 at 158-59). Mangum and Randall rented one
room while the other officers rented an adjoining room and monitored the recording
devices worn by Mangum and Randall and set-up in the motel room (R. 211 at 160).
Randall then paged Stanley; and when Stanley called, he was told where to come (R.
211 at 159-60).
When Stanley arrived at the motel, he knocked on the door and Mangum let him
into the room (R. 211 at 161). Stanley then spoke with Randall alone in the bathroom
for a few minutes (R. 211 at 161-62). Stanley then informed Mangum that he only had
one ounce of methamphetamine and that "maybe later he could get... the other half
(R. 211 at 162). Stanley then gave Mangum the methamphetamine and Mangum gave
him the money (R. 211 at 163). Mangum testified that Stanley then pulled some more

8

methamphetamine out and he gave some to Randall and "took a line out and snorted it"
(Id.).
The other officers then entered the room and Stanley and Randall were taken
down and handcuffed (R. 211 at 165). The officers then retrieved the money from
Stanley along with the box which contained the methamphetamine (Id.).
Mangum testified that he was wearing a recording device in the motel room and
that he believed a tape recording had been made of the transaction (R. 211 at 189-90).
However, Mangum indicated that he "never had contact with that tape" (R. 211 at
190). Mangum did testify that on one weekend, a water line broke and flooded the
evidence room (R. 211 at 197-98).
B.

Testimony of Edee Randall
Edee Randall testified that she met Detective Mangum at the Emery County Jail

and that she initiated the contact (R. 212 at 22). Randall testified that she asked for
Mangum because she had worked with him previously relating to "drugs" (R. 212 at
22-23). Randall testified that she told Mangum that she could arrange a drug buy from
Stanley (R. 212 at 22-23). Randall also testified that she wanted nothing from Mangum
in return but that she "figured that he would help release me" from jail (R. 212 at 23,
34). Randall, reluctantly, testified that she was in jail on a drug charge (R. 212 at 32).
Randall testified that, at the time of the transaction, she had been working as a
confidential informant for approximately six months (R. 212 at 28). Randall testified

9

that she had participated in approximately 170 controlled buys and mat she was
compensated $75/buy (Id.). Randall testified that the only instruction she received in
relation to her conduct as a confidential informant was to "be careful" (R. 212 at 3031).
Randall then paged Stanley and he returned the call (R. 212 at 23). Randall
testified that she asked Stanley "if he had any meth. And he said, 'Yeah,' And I asked
him if he could meet and how much to bring" (R. 212 at 23-24). Randall also testified
that she told Stanley that she had the money she owed him and that they could meet so
she could give it to him (R. 212 at 35). Randall testified that she "owed him money
from a prior drug deal" (R. 212 at 24, 35). Randall testified that Stanley that the ounce
she wanted would cost between $800-$1200 (R. 212 at 24-25).
Randall testified that she arranged to meet Stanley at the K-Mart in Spanish Fork
(R. 212 at 25). Randall testified that Stanley arrived at K-Mart before she and
Mangum did (R. 212 at 36). Randall testified that she had previously met with Stanley
there (Id.). Randall told him that she would be with a "guy with the money" (Id.).
Randall testified that she met wim Stanley at Spanish Fork, but mat she did not
get inside Stanley's vehicle and that it was not outside the presence of Mangum because
"his windows would have been down and he would have heard [her]" (R. 212 at 37).
Randall testified that she told Stanley that Mangum was a drug dealer from Price and
that she needed to get some methamphetamine for him to buy (R. 212 at 37-38).
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Randall testified that she did not tell Stanley that she was afraid of Mangum or that
Mangum had a weapon (R. 212 at 38). Randall testified that Stanley asked for the
$350 she owed him and that she indicated that she did not have the money (R. 212 at
39). However, Randall testified that she and Mangum gave Stanley $100 towards the
debt and that she "would have the rest later" (R. 212 at 39). Randall testified that they
arranged to meet later in Lehi (Id.).
Randall testified that once Stanley arrived at the motel room in Lehi, "He
counted out the money. He didn't have all of it. He only had, I think, half of it. He
said he could get the other half (R. 212 at 27). Randall testified that she never told
Stanley that she was afraid of Mangum and that Stanley showed no reluctance
concerning the transaction (Id.).
Randall testified that she was introduced to Stanley by Susie Webb (R. 212 at
25). She indicated that she had known Stanley for "a month or two" and that he had
visited her in Price "once or twice" (R. 212 at 40). Randall testified that she told
Stanley of her husband's death in a mining accident and that she was having financial
difficulties (Id.).
Randall also testified that Stanley was present "several times" when she was at
Webb's house (R. 212 at 41). However, Randall testified that she did not recall telling
Webb that she needed money for her trailer payment; and that Stanley never loaned her
money-he only loaned her drugs (R. 212 at 41-42).
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Randall testified that she was relying on her friendship with Stanley in order for
him to acquire the methamphetamine for her (R. 212 at 43). Randall testified that she
has prior misdemeanor convictions (R. 212 at 51). Randall also testified that she was
never given any instruction on "entrapment" or that there were certain boundaries
relating to her conduct in getting others to purchase drugs (R. 212 at 51).
Randall testified that her trailer was paid off in June of 1996 (R. 212 at 162).
Randall testified that Stanley had never repaired any of her vehicles (Id.). Randall also
testified that she had seen Stanley in the red Subaru in Lehi on some uncertain date
prior to March 27, 1997 (R. 212 at 162-63). Randall testified that she did not speak
with Stanley on this occasion (R. 212 at 163-64).
C.

Testimony of Patrick Stanley
Patrick Stanley, the defendant, testified that in February-March of 1997 he lived

in Salt Lake City (R. 212 at 69). Stanley testified that during this time he was selfemployed as a tree-trimmer (R. 212 at 69-70). Stanley testified that he was contacted
through the use of a pager (R. 212 at 70).
Stanley testified that he met Randall through Susie Webb (R. 212 at 71). Stanley
testified that in March of 1997 he had known Randall for "a couple of months" (R. 212
at 72). Stanley testified that he knew Randall's husband had died in a mining accident
and that he had voluntarily assisted her with repairs at her home in Price on a couple of
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occasions-including working on a vehicle that belonged to Randall's daughter (R. 212
at 72-73).
Stanley testified that the only thing he had loaned Randall was $350 to help her
with a trailer payment (R. 212 at 73-76). Stanley testified that prior to the night of
March 27, 1997, he never bought nor sold drugs to or from Randall (R. 212 at 76).
Stanley testified that on approximately March 20, 1997, Randall made
arrangements to meet Stanley at the K-Mart in Spanish Fork so that she could repay the
$350 loan (R. 212 at 76-77). Stanley testified that Randall, however, failed to appear
at the K-Mart at the arranged meeting time (R. 212 at 78). Stanley testified that he did
not hear from Randall until she paged him on March 27, 1997 (R. 212 at 78-79).
Stanley testified that he returned Randall's page (R. 212 at 79). Stanley asked
Randall what happened the previous week and Randall told him that she had rolled her
truck and had been in the hospital for the past week (R. 212 at 79). Randall then
informed Stanley that she had the money she owed him and that she could meet him at
K-Mart in Spanish Fork (R. 212 at 80). Stanley also testified that Randall told him that
she needed him to bring her "an ounce" of methamphetamine (R. 212 at 80, 131-32).
Stanley testified that he asked Randall if she had his money and that when she replied in
the affirmative, an arrangement was made to meet at the Spanish Fork K-Mart at 9
p.m. (R. 212 at 81). Randall told Stanley that she would be with a "friend" because he
truck had been totaled (R. 212 at 83).
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Stanley testified that he drove to Spanish Fork in a red Subaru that belonged to
Webb's roommate, who had borrowed Stanley's truck (Id.). When Stanley arrived at
the K-Mart, Randall was already present with Mangum, who at this time Stanley did
not know (R. 212 at 82-83). Randall approached Stanley's vehicle and climbed into his
passenger seat (R. 212 at 83-84).
Stanley asked for the money she owed him and she informed him that she did not
have it (R. 212 at 84). Stanley testified that, at this point, his "expression probably
changed because [he] thought, 'Well, what did you call me to drive all the way out here
for, again, telling me you had the money that you owed me, and now I get her and
you're telling me you don't have the money you owe me?" (R. 212 at 84). Stanley
testified that he was "very angry" (R. 212 at 85). Stanley then asked Randall why she
arranged the meeting if she did not have the money and Randall replied that she owes
"this guy some money and he's a drug dealer from Price" and that she needed Stanley's
help (R. 212 at 85).
Stanley testified that Randall then asked if he had brought her "an ounce" of
methamphetamine; and that when Stanley said "no", Randall commented that she
"owes this guy and I need to get him an ounce and I don't know what he'll do if I can't
pay him" (R. 212 at 86). Stanley testified that Randall appeared nervous and scared
(R. 212 at 86). Stanley asked Randall about her demeanor and she again indicated that
she owed this drug dealer money (R. 212 at 87). Stanley testified that as a friend, he
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was worried for her safety (R. 212 at 87, 136). Stanley testified that this concern was
heightened by an experience he learned of at 15 where some drug dealers who were
owed money cut a woman's toe off with a pair of bolt cutters (R. 212 at 88-90).
Stanley asked Randall if Mangum had a gun and she told him that she thought he did
(R. 212 at 90). Stanley offered to take Randall away but she told him that Mangum
knew where she lived (R. 212 at 90-91).
Randall then again asked Stanley for methamphetamine (R. 212 at 91). Stanley
responded that he had none (Id.). Randall asked if to go to Salt Lake and get some.
Stanley testified that he would think about it while getting a taco from Taco Time (R.
212 at 91-92). Stanley testified that, at this point, Randall was almost crying (R. 212 at
91).
Stanley then went to Taco Time while Randall returned to Mangum's car (R.
212 at 92). Stanley returned approximately 5-10 minutes later and met with Mangum
and Randall in front of Stanley's car (Id.). Stanley testified that Mangum is "much
bigger" than himself (R. 212 at 93). Stanley said that Mangum asked if Stanley was
going to get him an ounce of methamphetamine and that he told Mangum that he did
not have an ounce of methamphetamine and that he had come to get the money that
Randall owed him (R. 212 at 93). Stanley then said that Mangum told Randall that she
had not mentioned that she owed Stanley money (R. 212 at 94). Mangum then asked if
Stanley would get him the methamphetamine if Mangum paid the debt (Id.). Stanley
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finally agreed to try and get the methamphetamine so that Randall would not get hurt
(R. 212 at 95-96).
Stanley testified that arrangements were made to meet them later in Lehi and that
he would try to get the methamphetamine while Mangum, who was tired, got some
sleep at a motel (R. 212 at 96). Stanley testified that as he was in his car leaving
Spanish Fork, Mangum approached the vehicle and handed Stanley $100 for Randall's
debt and to "seal the deal" (R. 212 at 97, 136).
Stanley then drove to Salt Lake and made calls to try and procure some
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 98). He finally was able to procure 14 grams in a black
box along with some baggies (R. 212 at 99). Stanley took the box and returned
Randall's page (Id.). Stanley then drove to Lehi to meet Randall and Mangum at the
Timpanogos Inn (Id.).
Stanley knocked on the motel room door and Randall opened it while Mangum
sat on the bed (R. 212 at 100). Stanley then directed Randall into the bathroom and
handed the black box to her (R. 212 at 100-01). Randall opened the box and put some
methamphetamine in a blue bag before putting it in the box and returning the rest to a
separate bag (R. 212 at 102). Randall walked out of the bathroom with the bag and
Stanley picked up the box and followed her (R. 212 at 102-03).
Randall then handed the bag of methamphetamine to Mangum, who examined it
before returning it to Randall (R. 212 at 103). Mangum then pulled out $600 and gave
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it to Randall who gave it to Stanley (R. 212 at 103-04). Stanley then handed Randall
the methamphetamine from the black box and then, before closing the box, he blew the
remaining residue out of the box with a straw which had been inside (R. 212 at 104).
Stanley testified that he never snorted any of the methamphetamine nor were any
tests done to determine if he had the drug in his system (R. 212 at 104-05).
Stanley testified that Randall and Mangum then headed for the door while
Randall was talking with Stanley (R. 212 at 105). When Mangum turned the
doorknob, officers entered the room and put him down on the bed and cuffed his hands
as the box flew out of his hand (R. 212 at 105-06).
Stanley testified that the torch and alcohol found in the back of the Subaru did
not belong to him and that they were in a cardboard box with wood stain, steel wool
pads and razor blades (R. 212 at 107-09).
Stanley testified that he had never been convicted of distributing drugs but that
he had been convicted for possession of drugs along with providing an officer with
false information (R. 212 at 110-11).
D.

Testimony of Officer Richard Case
Richard Case, a deputy Sheriff with the Utah County Sheriffs department,

testified that in March of 1997 he was assigned as an undercover operative with the
Narcotics Enforcement Team (NET) (R. 211 at 250-51, 253). Case testified that on
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March 27, 1997, he was contacted by Mangum to provide assistance at an arranged
drug buy (R. 211 at 253-54).
Case testified that he monitored the Spanish Fork transaction between Mangum,
Randall and Stanley (R. 211 at 254). Case testified that he believed that a tape
recording was made of the transaction but that he personally did not make a tape (R.
211 at 254-55). Case testified that if a tape was made then it was made by Sergeant
Denton Johnston (R. 211 at 256). Case testified that sometimes there were problems
with the recording equipment and that some tapes were inaudible (R. 211 at 256). Case
testified that while he could not see the Spanish Fork transaction, he could hear it (R.
2Uat257).
Case testified that he was also present during the Lehi transaction and that he
was stationed outside the motel watching for the arrival of Stanley's vehicle (R. 211 at
258). After Stanley's arrest, Case assisted in the search of his vehicle (R. 211 at 259).
Case testified that denatured alcohol, a propane torch, a razor blade, and some
marijuana seeds were located in the vehicle (Id.).
E.

Testimony of Sergeant Denton Johnston
Denton Johnston, a sergeant with the Orem Police Department, testified that he

was assigned to NET in March of 1997 (R. 211 at 273). Johnston testified that he
assisted in a drug buy on March 27, 1997 (R. 211 at 274). During the Spanish Fork
transaction, Johnston was in a vehicle conducting surveillance (R. 211 at 274). During
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the Lehi transaction, Johnston was part of the arrest team located in the adjoining motel
room(R. 211 at 275).
Johnston testified that he could hear some of the Spanish Fork transaction
through monitoring a body wire worn by Mangum (R. 211 at 276, 278). Johnston
testified that his vehicle is equipped with a recording device or tape recorder (Id.).
Johnston indicated that "[he has] a habit of making a tape of everything on a wire. But
[he has] searched for that tape and [had] not located a tape that was made that night in
the car either at Spanish Fork or at Lehi" (Id.). Johnston testified that the only reason
he could think of for the failure to locate a tape, was that a tape was not made (Id.).
Johnston testified that if he had made a tape it would have been of the Spanish Fork
transaction only because he did not have any recording equipment in the Lehi motel
room(R. 211 at 280).
F,

Testimony of Detective Harold Terry
Harold Terry, a detective with the Lehi City Police Department, testified that in

March of 1997 he was assigned to NET (R. 211 at 281-82). Terry testified that he was
monitoring the Spanish Fork transaction through Mangum's body wire and taking
written notes of what he heard (R. 211 at 288-89). Terry testified that he heard Stanley
and Mangum "talk about the sale of two ounces for $1200. But [Stanley] said he had
an ounce at his house and... that he would go back to his house and get the ounce and
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bring it to a motel in Lehi if Detective Mangum would rent the rooms (R. 211 at 290-91).
Terry testified that he reserved motel rooms at the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi (R.
211 at 292). Terry testified that the Timpanogos Inn is located in a drug-free zone
because there is a playground at the McDonald's located across the street about a block
from the Inn as well as a high school (R. 211 at 294). Terry estimated the distance to
be approximately 630 feet (Id.). Terry said he knew the distance from a topographical
map of the area (Id.). However, Terry did not measure the distance nor had he
prepared a map for this case (R. 212 at 7).
Terry testified that the red Subaru driven by Stanley was not his car (R. 212 at
6). However, Terry testified that on March 21, 1997, he saw Stanley in the red Subaru
in Lehi betwen 3:30-4:30 p.m. talking with Randall from her vehicle (R. 212 at 165).
Terry testified that at the time he entered the motel room after the exchange, he
did not believe that Mangum was standing close enough to the door to have his hand on
the doorknob (R. 212 at 167). Terry admitted, however, that Mangum could have had
his hand on the doorknob sometime prior to his entry into the motel room (Id.).
G.

Testimony of Suzanne Webb
Suzanne Webb testified that she is a friend of Stanley's and that he trims trees

for a living (R. 212 at 60). Webb testified that she is also a friend of Randall's (R. 212
at 61). Webb testified that on February 15, 1997, she had a conversation with Randall
(R. 212 at 62). Randall informed Webb that she was having financial difficulties and
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that she was worried about losing her trailer (Id.). Webb offered to ask Stanley to loan
her some money (Id.). Webb then asked Stanley to loan Randall some money so she
would not lose her trailer (R. 212 at 62-63). Webb testified that she was present when
Stanley loaned Randall the money (R. 212 at 63).
Webb testified that on March 27, 1997, Stanley did not have his vehicle-a truck,
because he had loaned it to Webb's roommate so she could move some items; and that
Stanley was driving the roommate's red Subaru (R. 212 at 64).
H.

Stipulation relating to Testimony of Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner
The State stipulated that if Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner would testify, if

called, that Stanley loaned Randall money for a trailer payment (R. 212 at 67).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
One, Stanley asserts that the trial court's instruction to the jury on the issue of
entrapment was legally insufficient because it failed to instruct the jury on the objective
standard of entrapment and because it failed to instruct the jury on the factors they were
to consider rendering their judgment. This inadequate instruction left the jury in a
position that they could not fully understand the issue of entrapment which they were
called to decide. Stanley also maintains that this deficiency was prejudicial.
Two, Stanley asserts that under State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724 (Utah App.
1996), the trial court committed obvious and prejudicial error by instructing the jury

21

that Stanley's prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance was a
substantive element of Count III instead of a sentencing enhancement. Stanley asserts
that the jury should have been given evidence of the prior conviction in a bifurcated
manner as is required for conviction of felony DUI's and other offenses.
Three, Stanley argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel based upon the failure of trial counsel to recognize and object to
the plain and prejudicial error committed at trial. Stanley also bases this claim upon
trial counsel's failure to adequately study and comprehend the language and meaning of
the applicable statutes and case law and the corresponding language in the jury
instructions.
Four, Stanley asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the drug offenses actually occurred in a drug-free zone.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RELATING TO
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
Throughout the trial court proceedings, Stanley raised the defense of entrapment
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303. Stanley filed a pre-trial motion claiming
that the case against him should be dismissed with prejudice because he was entrapped
as a matter of law (R. 23-33). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
22

Stanley's motion (R. 37-38, 209). Stanley, likewise, raised an entrapment defense at
trial and the jury was instructed on the issue.
Stanley asserts that the trial court's instructions to the jury as to the defense of
entrapment were legally insufficient. This Court should review the trial court's
statutory construction and its application of the entrapment statute as questions of law
that are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah
App. 1992). Moreover, a trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction is
likewise a question of law which should be reviewed for "correctness". State v.
Squire. 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994).
Prior to trial, Stanley submitted a proposed jury instruction on the issue of
entrapment, which is included in the addenda (R. 246). Stanley's proposed instruction
contained the language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) as well as language from
State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)--the landmark case in Utah on the issue of
entrapment. Stanley's proposed instruction was discussed at length between Stanley,
the State, and the trial court (R. 212 at 176-90). Over Stanley's objection, the trial
court instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment only with the language of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) (R. 212 at 190).
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) and Jury Instruction #11 state:
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed
by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense
in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods
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creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it.
Stanley asserts that this instruction (Instruction #11 (R. 143)), which is included in the
addenda, is legally insufficient: One, because it fails to instruct the jury that it should
employ an "objective" standard of entrapment; and two, because it fails to instruct the
jury on the factors that it shall consider in making its determination of entrapment.
A.

Jury Instruction #11 is legally insufficient because it fails to inform the jury
of the "obejctive" standard of entrapment.
In State v.Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that

an "objective" standard or view, which focuses on the conduct of law enforcement
personnel and not the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime, must be employed
by fact finders under § 76-2-303 in their determination as to whether a defendant was
entrapped. 599 P.2d at 501-03. Since Taylor. Utah courts have adhered to this
standard or view in reviewing claims of entrapment. See, e.g., State v. Kaufman. 734
P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1987); State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986)
(Objective standard of entrapment focuses not on propensities of specific defendant but
on whether police conduct "falls below standards, to which the common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power".); State v. Byrns. 911 P.2d 981,
988 (Utah App. 1995) (Test for entrapment is objective view and focus is not on
propensities and predisposition of specific defendant but on police conduct.); State v.
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995) (Utah entrapment statute requires objective
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review of each individual situation that focuses on actions of government and not on
defendant's predisposition.).
Stanley asserts that the jury should have been instructed, as he requested, on the
objective standard of entrapment and that they were to focus their deliberations on the
conduct of the police and their agent rather than on his predisposition or propensity to
commit the crime(R. 212 at 177-78). In addition to the statutory language set forth
above, Stanley requested that the jury be instructed that "The entrapment defense
requires an objective review of each situation focusing solely on the actions of the
government and not on the defendant's predisposition" (R. 246) This language was
utilized by this Court in State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995), to define
the objective standard of entrapment.
"The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist them in
understanding issues which they have to decide in the case. Included in a judge's duty
to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case is 'the right of the defendant to
have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way.'"
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). Stanley asserts
that without being instructed on the objective standard, the jury could not fully
understand the defense of entrapment which was necessary to their decision in this case.
Moreover, without instruction on the objective standard of entrapment, the jury would
not know where to focus their deliberations as it relates to Stanley's defense of
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entrapment. Stanley further asserts, that without such guidance to the jury, Instruction
#11 is legally insufficient and requires reversal of his convictions.
B.

Jury Instruction #11 is legally insufficient because it failed to provide the
jury with the factors they must consider in their determination of
entrapment.
Stanley asserts that Jury Instruction #11 is also legally insufficient because it

fails to instruct the jury on the factors that it shall consider in making its determination
of entrapment. In addition to instructing the jury on the statutory definition of
entrapment and the objective standard, Stanley also requested that the jury instruction
on entrapment include language from State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), which
provides the jury with examples of possible entrapment and with factors that must be
considered in judging the issue of entrapment under an objective standard (R. 246).
The language that Stanley requested from Taylor reads:
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on
sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of
money are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each
case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the
course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the
defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be
considered in judging what the effect of the governmental agent's conduct would
be.
(R. 246); Taylor. 599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). This language has repeatedly
been quoted and utilized by Utah appellate courts in reviewing entrapment cases. See,
State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989); State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d 747, 749
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(Utah 1984); State in the Interest of J.D.W.. 910 P.2d 1242, 1243-44 (Utah App.
1995); State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d
685, 689 (Utah App. 1993); State v. LeVasseur. 854 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah App.
1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Richardson.
843 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah App.
1987).
Stanley asserts that this language-this guidance-provided by the Utah Supreme
Court in Taylor has become indispensable to any meaningful review and analysis of the
issue of entrapment; and that the jury should have been so instructed. Furthermore, in
Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated that "in evaluating the course of conduct
between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions leading up to
the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the
governmental agent's conduct would be." 599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). If these
factors are "all to be considered in judging" the effect of the government's conduct, it
is only logical that the jury should be instructed on these factors so that they know what
to consider in their deliberations. Stanley asserts, that without such guidance, the jury
cannot fully understand the issue of entrapment. Accordingly, he requests that this
Court find that Jury Instruction #11 was legally insufficient and that his convictions
must, therefore, be reversed.
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C.

The erroneous jury instruction was harmful.
Stanley asserts that he was prejudiced by the legally insufficient instruction given

to*the jury on the issue of entrapment. If the jury had been instructed properly on the
issue of entrapment, as requested by Stanley, a reasonable likelihood existed of a more
favorable result. As instructed by the trial court, the jury lacked the legal
understanding to properly assess Stanley's entrapment defense. The jury did not know
what test or standard to apply to their deliberations, where their focus should be, or
what factors they must consider in judging his entrapment claim.
For example, the jury did not know that they were to focus their attention on the
conduct of Randall and Mangum rather than on any predisposition he might have to sell
or use drugs. Because the jury lacked this knowledge, they could have placed undue
influence on Stanley's prior conviction for drug possession and on Randall's testimony
that she owed Stanley money from a prior drug deal (R. 212 at 24, 35).
On the other hand, had the jury been instructed that their focus was to be on
Randall and Mangum's conduct, and that they were to consider "the transactions
leading up to the offense" and "the interaction between the agent and the defendant",
then the jury would have considered the following: One, that Randall was a confidential
informant who had participated in approximately 170 controlled buys and that she was
paid $75/buy (R. 211 at 178; 212 at 28). Two, that Randall was being held in the
Emery County Jail on drug charges (R. 211 at 140, 181; 212 at 22). Three, that
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Randall asked to speak with Mangum (R. 212 at 22-23). Four, that Randall offered to
arrange a drug buy with Stanley if Mangum would get her released from jail (R. 211 at
141). Four, Mangum did not know Stanley nor that Randall owed Stanley money (R.
211 at 141, 153). Five, that Randall-in the presence of Mangum-contacted Stanley
and supposedly told him to bring an ounce of methamphetamine to the Spanish Fork KMTart (R. 211 at 144-45).3 Six, that Mangum told Randall to inform Stanley that she
had been in a traffic accident and that Mangum was a drug-dealer friend with whom
she was staying (R. 211 at 146-47; 212 at 37-38).4 Seven, that when Stanley met
Mangum and Randall at the K-Mart, he asked for the money that Randall owed him and
he had no methamphetamine with him (R. 211 at 151-52; 212 at 39, 84, 91). Eight,
that Randall and Stanley had a conversation in his vehicle at K-Mart that could not be
heard by Mangum or the others (although Randall denied this) (R. 211 at 150; 212 at
83-84). Stanley testified that during this conversation, Randall appeared to be nervous
and scared and that he was worried for her safety (R. 212 at 86, 87, 90-91). Stanley
also testified that Randall told him that she needed his help because she owed Mangum
3

According, to Stanley's testimony, Randall informed him that she had the $350 rent
money that she had borrowed from him and that Randall also asked him to bring an ounce
of methamphetamine to the K-Mart (R. 212 at 76-77, 80).
4

This is consistent with Stanley's testimony that Randall had told him that she had
been in the hospital because she had rolled her truck the previous week; and that her truck
was totaled so that she would be with a "friend" (R. 212 at 79, 83). It is also consistent
wkh Stanley's testimony that during his conversation with Randall in his car, Randall
informed him that Mangum was a drug dealer from Price whom she owed money (R. 212
at 85).
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money and that he was a drug-dealer (R. 212 at 85). Nine, that only after this private
conversation with Randall did Stanley agree to the drug transaction so that Randall
would not get hurt (R. 212 at 95-96).
Stanley asserts that had the jury been properly instructed on the objective
standard of entrapment and the factors from Taylor that they were to consider in
rendering their judgment, then they would have been required to consider the evidence
set forth above, and that a reasonable likelihood existed for a more favorable result.
Moreover, Randall clearly admitted that she relied on her friendship with Stanley in his
acquisition of the methamphetamine (R. 212 at 43). Had the jury been properly
instructed that "appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal
firendship" might constitute entrapment, then Stanley, likewise, would have had a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.
Stanley asserts that had the jury been properly instructed as to his claim of
entrapment, a reasonable likelihood exists that he would have been given a more
favorable result by the jury. Stanley asserts that is reasonable that a properly instructed
jury would have found that, but for the prohibited conduct of Randall and Mangum in
inducing him to the motel with methamphetamine, then he would not have engaged in
the conduct for which he was convicted. Accordingly, Stanley asks that this Court
reverse his convictions because the trial court erroneously and prejudicially instructed
the jury as to the issue of entrapment.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT STANLEY'S PRIOR CONVICTION
WAS A SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT OF COUNT III
Count III of the criminal information filed against Stanley alleged that he used or
possessed methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction for possession
of a controlled substance. As such, Count III was charged as a first degree felony
under Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) as a "second or subsequent conviction" (R.
24). Jury Instruction #5, which sets forth the substantive elements of Count III, adds as
a ninth element that Stanley "had previously been convicted of possession of a
controlled substance on August 1, 1994" (R. 149). Stanley asserts that it was clear
error for the trial court to instruct the jury that Stanley's prior conviction was a
substantive element of Count III. Stanley asserts that the plain language of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) provides that prior convictions shall enhance the penalty of
the charged crime but does not change the substantive elements of the charged crime.
Although Stanley did not object to Jury Instruction #5, this Court may review the
instruction under Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in order "to avoid
a manifest injustice. See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); and State v.
Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court in Verde considered the
meaning of "manifest injustice" and determined that "in most circumstances, the term
manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." 773 P.2d at 121-22.
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Therefore, to obtain appellate relief for erroneous jury instructions, Stanley must show:
"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the
error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
This Court has previously addressed this issue under Utah Code Annotated § 5837-8(1 )(b) and concluded that it was plain error for the trial court to include as a
substantive element of the charged crime that defendant had a prior conviction under §
58-37-8(l)(a). This Court held that the plain language of the statute clearly (and
Obviously) establishes that a prior conviction does not change the nature of the charged
crime but merely enhances the penalty. State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah
App. 1996). As the language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) is substantially
equivalent to the language of § 58-37-1(b), Stanley urges this Court to find that the trial
court's inclusion of Stanley's prior conviction as a substantive element of Count III was
likewise obvious error-particularly where the trial court judge in this case was the trial
court judge in the Portillo case.
Stanley asserts that the trial court should have bifurcated the evidence of his
prior possession conviction from the evidence related exclusively to the commission of
current charges. For example, in State v. Stewart. 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946), the Utah
Supreme Court outlined a bifurcated procedure to be followed by trial courts in DUI
cases which involve prior-DUI convictions and purport to impose a greater punishment
for a subsequent DUI offense. The purpose of this procedure, in the absence of
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legislative direction, was to "properly expedite the adjudication of such cases, while at
the same time safeguard[ing] the substantial rights of accused persons and to prevent an
accused person from being advertised to the jury as one who previously perpetrated a
similar type of offense." Stewart. 171 P.2d at 386. This procedure was instigated by
the Court "in view of the prejudicial nature of the evidence of prior conviction as such
evidence bears on proof of commission of the substantive offense." Id Stanley
maintains that this bifurcated procedure should similarly be adopted to drug charges
that the State is seeking to enhance based on prior convictions.
Finally, Stanley asserts, that like the obvious error in Portillo. the trial court's
obvious error prejudiced him and deprived him of a "reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result" and should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. Dunn.
850 P.2d at 1208-09.
At trial, Stanley raised the affirmative defense of entrapment to the charges
against him. The defense of entrapment relies on an objective standard which focuses
not on the defendant's conduct or his predisposition to commit a crime, but on the
conduct of law enforcement personnel and their agents. However, Stanley's credibility
was still critical to his defense. Jury Instruction #5 removed the attention of the juror's
fifOm the issue of entrapment and the conduct of Mangum and Randall and focused it
squarely on Stanley's history. Accordingly, Stanley was deprived of a more favorable
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result in relation to his entrapment defense. As such, this Court should conclude that
the trial court's erroneous jury instruction was also prejudicial and requires reversal.

POINT III
STANLEY WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised concurrently with
aff allegation of plain error because if the error was plain to the court, it should also
have been plain to trial counsel. See, Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1208-09, 1225-29 (Utah
1993); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S.
1024 (1990); and State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 826 (Utah App. 1994).
As a result, this Court should conclude as a matter of law that, based upon the
obvious errors in Jury Instruction #5 to which no objection was made, Stanley was
denied the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah
App. 1993) ("Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this
court can only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if
it can do so as a matter of law.").
In determining whether Stanley was denied the effective assistance of counsel
"this court cannot apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.f" Strickland
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v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State v. Snyder. 860
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993).
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show:
(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for
counsel's error." State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v.
Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Geary. 707 P.2d 645, 646
(Utah 1985). As the Strickland two-prong test is being utilized, it should be
remembered that the right to effective counsel is a crucial element of a criminal
Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the focus of the review should be "on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged." Strickland.
466 U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; Snyder. 860 P.2d at 354.
A.

Trial Counsel Rendered a Demonstrably Deficient Performance
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Defendant must show that

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, but the
court is not to second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland. 466
UTS. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennvson. 850 p.2d 461, 465 (Utah App.
1993); Crestani. 707 P.2d at 1089. It should have been obvious to counsel-as well as
the court-that the question of penalty or punishment is not within the province of the
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jury. Therefore, counsel should have objected to the court's penalty instructions and
requested that they be stricken from the record.
Likewise, counsel had an obligation to submit and to carefully consider the
proposed jury instructions. If counsel had taken the time to carefully read and study
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (2)(d) and State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724
(Utah App. 1996), then it would have become obvious to her that subsection 8(2)(d)
that whether a charged count is a second or subsequent conviction is not an essential
criminal element, but a mere sentencing enhancement. At the very least, counsel
should have at least strongly voiced her exceptions to such instructions particularly in
light of the entrapment defense she was presenting to the jury.
Similarly, if this Court concludes that trial counsel invited the trial court's
erroneous Instruction #5 because she stipulated that Stanley had a prior conviction and
that such language be included in Jury Instruction #3, then counsel's performance was
likewise deficient. The jury should not have been instructed as to Stanley's prior
conviction particularly before reaching a verdict on the underlying offense.
Fundamental fairness requires that counsel should of at least argued for a bifurcated
proceeding where the jury is only given evidence of the prior conviction after rendering
a guilty verdict on the underlying offense.
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B.

Absent Counsel1 s Deficient Performance a Reasonable Likelihood of a More
Favorable Result for Portillo Existed
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a

reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability has been described as
"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See Strickland.
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Tennyson. 850 P.2d at 466; Crestam, 771 P.2d at
1089. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Crestani. 771 P.2d at
1092. In this particular case the adversarial process cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result. Had counsel done her homework with respect to the status of
the law in regards to the impropriety of the jury being instructed with regards to
punishment, and had counsel carefully studied the proposed jury instructions in
connection with the applicable statute, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different
result would have been reached at trial.
Therefore, this Court should vacate Stanley's convictions on grounds that
"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."
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POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICENT
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT AS TO THE
"DRUG-FREE ZONE" ELEMENT
Stanley was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, distribution of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone and use/possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone (R. 156, 157). Whether the underlying drug offense is subject to a
"drug-free zone" enhancement is an element of the offense which must be proved by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App.
1996). Stanley asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the
jury's verdict as to the "drug-free zone" element.
Jury Instruction #9 defines a "drug-free zone" as "any area within 1,000 feet of
any structure, facility or grounds of: 1) a public or private elementary or secondary
school; 2) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution; 3) in
those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are,
at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution; 4) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 5) in a public
park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 6) in a church or synagogue; 7) in
a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 8) in a public parking lot or structure" (R.
145). See also, Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a).
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The underlying drug offenses for which Stanley was convicted occurred in a
room at the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi at approximately 11p.m. (R. 211 at 147-49, 15965, 275). Officer Harold Terry testified that the Timpanogos Inn is located in a drugfree zone because there is a playground at the McDonald's located across the street
about a block from the Inn as well as part of the high school grounds (R. 211 at 294).
Terry estimated the distance to be approximately 630 feet (Id.). Terry said he knew the
distance was within the 1,000 foot radius because he had al one time-involving another
case-looked at the distance on a topographical map (Id.). However, Tern did noi
measure the distance-either from the edge of the motel property, or more specifically,
from the actual motel room—nor had he prepared a map for this case (R. 212 at 7). No
other testimony or evidence was pi mini ai J( dial concerning whether or not the
underlying offenses at the motel room took place within 1,000 feet of the high school
grounds or McDonald's playground.
Even assuming that the McDonald's playground qualifies as a "drug-free zone",
Stanley asserts that the evidencr piodm al it I (rial was insufficient to establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the underlying offenses took place within 1,000 feet ol such a
drug-free zone. Powasnik. 918 P.2d at 148 ("Drug-free zone" enhancement is element
of underlying offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); State v.
Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (Jurv verdict must be reversed for insufficient
evidence if evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entntained a
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reasonable doubt). Terry's testimony, which consisted entirely of his estimate as to
distance and his one-time check of a topographical map, may have established that a
portion of the Timpanogos Inn was located within 1,000 feet of the high school grounds
or McDonald's playground. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that the actual
motel room where the underlying offenses occurred is within 1,000 of such drug-free
zones. Accordingly, Stanley requests that this Court reverse his convictions because
the evidence produced at trial was too inconclusive to establish, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the underlying drug offenses actually occurred in a drug-free zone.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Stanley respectfully asks that this Court reverse his convictions because the trial
court's instructions to the jury relating to the defense of entrapment were legally
insufficient and prejudicial. Alternatively, Stanley asks that this Court find that the trial
court committed plain error in instructing the jury that Stanley's prior conviction was a
substantive element of Count III; and that Stanley's trial counsel was likewise
ineffective. Finally, Stanley requests that this Court find that the evidence produced at
trial was insufficient and inconclusive to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Count I and Count III took place in a drug-free zone..
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X day of September, 1999.
)

Margaret^. Cindsay
Counsel for Stanley
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Vppeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2 i W of
September, 1999.
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58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

section (8). Each separate violation o: this subsection is a
thir.: degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty
n • :•.? exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 5S-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall
h, deposited in the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit
information to the database as required under this section
after the division has submitted a specific written request
for the information or when the division determines the
individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit
the information as required is grounds for the division to
take the following actions in accordance with Section
5S-1-401:
(i) refuse to iss...- a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(hi) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more t h a n $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civi' violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(IS) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
uvihy liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shal! be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of anv resources within the Commerce Service
Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
'
1996
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
.>> •
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
u v-^
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
'•••* *
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
where:
-•. .-.•• ••'•••••,-.>;/A • -v.
(A) the person participates, directs; or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felon}'; and
(B) the violation is a p a r t of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions t h a t are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the
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person occupies a position of organizer, supervi.
sor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (ijfoj
with inspect to:
. ;,*
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II o r ;
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secon*
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent COQ.
viction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV ^
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and UTW
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a secoo*
degree felony; or
'^4
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyf!
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsd
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felonyyi
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable hi
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less thai!
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition £
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and tin!
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally• jj
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it w«l
obtained under a valid prescription or order, dire™
from a practitioner while acting in the course of & |
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized yfj
this subsection;
*I
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boci
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally*!
permit them to be occupied by .persons unlawfbl?
possessing, using, or distributing controlled
stances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally
possess an altered or forged prescription or writ
order for a controlled substance.
,
(b) Any person convicted of violating S u b
(2)(a)(i) with respect to:
*,v»
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds orn
is guilt}- of a second degree felony;
i« ( '
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II,
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, bu^
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance ani
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant,"
the amount is more than one ounce but less thai
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted 'of violating Sul
(2Xa)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of pi
• occupied by any correctional facility as defined in
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confini
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greaf
provided in Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty
provided in this subsection.
'-',l,:\l
- ( e ) Any person who violates'Subsection (2)(aX£
respect to all other controlled substances not incl
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less thaifj
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemc?
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent cm1
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Sul
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: •
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* fj) an a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-

58-37-8.5

(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
i ) o & a second conviction, guilty of a class A
(viii); or
^demeanor; and
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age,
§53 on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
^&E& degree felony.
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of
P^gafced acts C — Penalties:
, « (a)B: is unlawful for any person knowingly and intennot less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of
# to use in the course of the manufacture or
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
. ^arfwition of a controlled substance a license numeligible for probation.
^ fcor which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
. to Mother person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
established would have been less than a first degree
oaitoBed substance, to assume the title of, or reprefelony but for this subsection, a person convicted under
jffiMfiiTiH < Ifln be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoththis subsection is guilty of one degree more than the
physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other aumaximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
person;
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
subsection
that the actor mistakenly believed the indito procure the administration of, to obtain a
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
ton
for,
to
prescribe
or
dispense
to
any
perc
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
to be attempting to acquire or obtain
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where
n of, or to procure the administration of any
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a)
substance by misrepresentation or failure
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred
fcfKbe person to disclose his receiving any controlled
was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
jafisftnce from another source, fraud, forgery, decep(5)
Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
ttajSafeterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writspecified is a class B misdemeanor.
t n i f * " ' for a controlled substance, or the use of a
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
afermme or address;
0 f e * make any false or forged prescription or offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty
order for a controlled substance, or to utter of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.
or to alter any prescription or written order
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
aHBoicr written under the terms of this chapter; or
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra„ $$ to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law.
$jafc*,sfcone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
acsgsoduce the trademark, trade name, or other
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
I M masking mark, imprint, or device of another or any
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
, JSBBKSE of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
afcnoKr or labeling so as to render any drug a
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi. aaarffedeit controlled substance.
K&arperson convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a conBgnl|p£a third degree felony.
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
MSStad acts D —- Penalties:
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
iding other provisions pf this section, a ' of the substance or substances.
authorized under this chapter who commits
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
to be unlawful under this section, Title faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
conviction subject to the penalties and
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com- and supervision.'
'
- ** ' >
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under
i a public or private elementary or secondary this section on:
1
•r on the grounds of any of those schools;
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Suba a public or private vocational school or
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
l^fatitammdary institution or on the grounds of any of
" an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
(
ols or institutions;
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
v
those portions of any building, park, stathe ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
l e r other structure or grounds which are, at the
(b)' any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
7
<
fthe act,* being used for an activity sponsored
legitimate scope of his employment. 1 - i l ° * l t r j
t
gh a school or institution under Subsec- M **(ll) If any provision of this chapter? or'the application of
41
Ki) and (ii);
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
^ K i n o r on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
* invalid provision or application.
'^"
? **w «1997
La public park, amusement park, arcade, or
» ' •»
, . w,
* =? r ii ( » « * ' i - .
v * <,%}
x
i center;
* : u J.
58-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 p r o s e c u t i o n s u n d e r
W£a?a church or synagogue;
t h i s chapter.
* f <• :
*€fi&*m a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the
ater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters
i adjacent thereto; >
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
*4K k iaa public parking lot or structure;
chapter.
^
- 1997
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CRIMINAL CODE
(jfieMtai agent of a corporation or association v* ho
a^^riaes of such responsibility that his conduct
-ggaaifely may be assumed to represent the policy of
ffiM«rooration or association
^iEttgoration" means all organizations required by
j. Tfoffg i f this state or any other state to obtain a
^jrfggsdte of authority, a certificate of incorporation or
^forfoam*of registration to transact busuiess as a
^gast&m withm this state or any other state and shall
-mjfr^kAamestic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corpora«gMmyto&shall not mclude a corporation sole, as such
mi in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated
•& of an appropriate certificate of authority,
or other form of registration shall be no
t such organization conducted its business in
feto appear to have lav* ful corporate existence
1973

76-2-304

76-2-302. Compulsion.
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a
person of reasonable firmness m his situation would not have
resisted
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable
that he will be subjected to duress
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1)
provided
1973

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into comt
'tfKSSSf
flfcsniinal
responsibility
for
direct
c
o
m
m
i
s
re
mitting the offense Entrapment occurs when a law enforceh
snaa of offense or for c o n d u c t of another.
his
ment officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation
3
^targfciwa, acting with the mental state required fo~ the
to
with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order
imrg0ssSL *& am offense who directly commits the offense,
to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution bv
^pgaSasHfaests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
his
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
i to engage in conduct which constitutes an
lact
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it Conduct
jfosr&W'*'criminally
hable
as
a
party
for
such
conduct
the* |
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense
nth
does not constitute entrapment
lhe
. jBta&nses unavailable i n p r o s e c u t i o n b a s e d
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when
use*"
imeonduct of another.
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
flugagg&Bscution m which an actor's criminal responsibil- offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct
wibrfiffl: the conduct of another, it is no defense
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
ISHfe&the actor belongs to a class of persons v. ho by person perpetrating the entrapment
* (jmu&moithe offense is legally incapable of committing
(3) The defense provided b> this section is available even
ttitoeAamin an individual capacity, or
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to
&OT&1E the person for whose conduct the actor is
constitute the offense
r responsible has been acquitted, has not been
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall
lor convicted, has been convicted of a different
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of
* of a different type or class of offense or is fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit
l prosecution
1973 the offense Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may
IIWSMKL l u m i n a l responsibility of c o r p o r a t i o n o r aspermit a later filing
jftBtiation.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was
Mmspsstwa or association is guilty of an offense when
$Hi3£ei conduct constituting the offense consists of an entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue
j jnsiim&i discharge a specific duty of affirmative performay be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial Any
mmmmgased on corporations or associations by law, or
u
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment
KHfeconduct constituting the offense is authorized,
shall be appealable by the state
taSayg. requested, commanded, or undertaken, per(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense
SmmMJtir lecklessly tolerated by the board of directors or
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall
3ipa2|a^nianagerial agent acting within the scope of his
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant
m$jj$mai and m behalf of the corporation or associa^iw
1973 testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felomes
and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on
responsibility of p e r s o n for c o n - entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial
i n n a m e of c o r p o r a t i o n o r a s s o c i a t i o n .
1973
criminally hable for conduct constituting an
76-2-304. Ignorance or m i s t a k e of fact or law.
lie performs or causes to be performed in the
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact
of a corporation or association to the same
conduct were performed in his own name or which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
1973 prosecution for that crime
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless
PART 3
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably beheved his conduct did not constitute an offense,
I TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
and
u n d e r f o u r t e e n y e a r s o l d n o t crimi(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's
.¥
xmdfy responsible.
reasonable reliance upon
KlpWimai*crimmally responsible for conduct performed
d) An official statement of the law contained in a
^^WfeftajwcbBs the age of fourteen years This section shall
written order or grant of permission by an adminis**toto&$Hauk the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the
trative agency charged by law with responsibility for
K#%ft*acar«f this state
1973
interpreting the law m question, or
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CAMILLE L. NEIDER (7266)
i r :: COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, ASSOCIATION
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Prr -'0. Utah S~ v6
(SO- • 279-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
5TATE 0 7 UT.' H. UTAH COUNTY
."• ' T E G ; UTAH.
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OE POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
BASED ON ENTRAPMENT

vs.
Case No. 971400540
PATRICK STANLEY,
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendant.
Defendant, Patrick Stanley, by and through counsel, Camille L. Neider hereby submits the
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based
on Entrapment.
RELEVANT FACTS
On March 27,1997, Mr. Stanley was contacted by Edee Randall, a confidential informant for
Emery County Sheriffs Office, about repayment of a personal loan. Mr. Stanley and Ms. Randall met
in Spanish Fork in order for Ms. Randall to repay the debt Ms. Randall was accompanied by
undercover officer from the Emery Count}' Sheriffs Office. During the conversations that took place
b. . een Mr. Stanley and Ms. Randall, sor ~ of which were not ;;ea: d or recorded by the undercover
officer, Ms. Randall exploited her personal relationship with Mr. Stanley and entrapped him into helping
her acquire methamphetamine.

ARGUMENT
Utah law recognizes a defendant's right to assert an affirmative defense of entrapment. U.C.A.
§ 76-2-303; State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). The State continues to bear the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt after a defendant asserts an affirmative defense such as entrapment. State v.
Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). If there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not defendant was entrapped, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal,
either as a matter of law as determined by the judge or as a matter of fact as determined by the fact
finder. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980).
Utah Code defines entrapment as follows:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute
entrapment.
U.C.A. § 76-2-303 (1).
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted an "objective" standard for determining whether or not
entrapment has occurred. Taylor, 599 P.2d at 502. The objective standard focuses on the conduct of the
police and their agents rather than the disposition of the criminal defendant. State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d
1, 3 (Utah App. 1995). Entrapment turns on the facts of each case and several factors must be
considered by the trial court in order to determine whether or not entrapment occurred. Id. At a
minimum, "in evaluating the course of conduct between the government representative and the
defendant, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the
defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the

effect of the governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal person." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. The
Utah Supreme Court cautioned trial courts tnat this is not an '"average person" test but one that considers
the circumstances of each defendant in rel^'-'on to the police conduct. State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 750
(19S4).
Examples of behavior that rise to the level of entrapment are "[ejxtreme pleas of d operate
ilh.. : s. of appeals base i prh:vn":!y on sympathy, pity • -,;• close personal friendship, or offers <.7 inordinate
sums of money..." Taylor. 599 P.2d at 503. Utah Courts have found the "mere existence of a personal
relaiionship does not establish entrapment," but that exploitation of the "relationship in an eppeal to
defendant's sympathy of pity" does establish entrapment. Beddoes. 890 P.2d at 3 (internal cites
omitted); State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah App. 1993)..
In this case, Mr. Stanley's relationship with Ms. Randall was exploited and resulted in
entrapment by the State's representative.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Stanley respectfully requests the charges in the above captioned
case be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

of July 1997.

Camflle L. Neider
"Attorney for Mr. Stanley

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Entrapment to be hand delivered to the Office of
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ^ day of A > , _ / t ^
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INSTRUCTION NO. M

It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
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INSTRUCTION N'O.
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It is a"defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the ouense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement cf^cer or a person direct ^ by or acting in
:ooperatior; with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of
:ommiss:or: for prosecution - method, '....eating a so..:.onitiai risk tiiat die of:dnse would be
connm'tee ov one r..r ocivcrwnse. reaov v
The test to determine an unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an
agenc, in order to ob;ain evidence of the commission of an offense, induced the defendant to commit
such an offense v^idijvmldJ^e^ffero
me r ely^pT eTTtl ^Tc^o7tu~m

• croffei ;se~

Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close
personal friendship, o; offers of inordinc .. sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation
of the circumstances in each case of what might constiaite prohibited police conduct. In evaluating
the course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions
leading up to the offense, the interaction eetween the agent and the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the governmental
agent's conduct would be on a normal -person.—

DmA tot fa ty J4^unfc

prjtilfSfosnm>^ %

^Jjdo^S

p. 3
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INSTRUCTION NO

0

The essential elements of the cnme^charged in <25^S£28?of the Amended Information are as
follows:
£>

That the defendant, Patrick Stanley,
On or about March 27, 1997,

*§)

In Utah County, Utah,

@>

Did knowingly and intentionally,

t|)

Use. ^

(6)

Methamphetamine,

$)

A Schedule II controlled substance,

$)

In a drug free zone,

(§>

And had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance onB6&tefs*f

P^SLGS

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more
of iirabove essential elements of the crime, you should find the defendant not guilty. On the other
haailif the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as
setliilfi above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the crime.

